On February 19, 2001, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission announced that Chinese residents would be allowed to own B-share classes of stocks traded on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. These share classes were previously restricted to foreign investors while domestic residents were only permitted to hold A-share classes of stock. This regulatory change triggered a dramatic decline of prevailing B-share discounts from 80% down to 40%. We examine the changes in B-share discounts across 76 stocks and how they relate to fundamental attributes of the stocks. We find that the largest declines in the B-share discounts around this regulatory event are concentrated in the firms with low government ownership stakes and are unrelated to the firms' risks, relative supplies of shares outstanding and liquidity attributes. This surprising finding challenges the current wisdom that foreign investors require a higher political risk premium for investing companies with a higher proportion of shares owned by the state. We offer an alternative interpretation and our findings have important implications on China's financial liberalization policies.
Introduction
Interest in foreign equity markets, especially in emerging economies, has continued to expand over the past decade. Even recent crises have not stopped global investors from seeking higher returns and international diversification opportunities in foreign stock markets. In many markets, foreign investors still have to contend with investment barriers in the form of restrictions on foreign equity ownership. Such barriers are of particular interest because the limits they impose can induce a form of capital market segmentation in which foreigners can trade local equities among themselves at a price premium (or discount) relative to those shares traded by local investors. Segmentation in the form of premiums and discounts on shares around the world with foreign ownership restrictions has received considerable attention in the Finance and Economics literature because it helps to understand what drives the demand for cross-border investments in the first place.
1 Researchers have rationalized the existence of these premiums/discounts with hypotheses about differences in risk, turnover and liquidity, differences in general supply and demand conditions of restricted and unrestricted shares, as well as the asymmetry of information or risk tolerances between foreign and local investors.
Foreign ownership restrictions in China's stock market have been especially perplexing for researchers because large and persistent price discounts, rather than the usual premiums, have continued to exist for those shares restricted to foreign investors (B-shares) relative to those only available to domestic residents (A-shares). Researchers have rationalized the Chinese B-share discount (on average 80%) with hypotheses about differences in risk (Bailey (1994) and Eun, Janakiramanan and Lee (2001) ), in turnover and liquidity (Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) ), in general supply and demand conditions of restricted and unrestricted shares (Sun and Tong (2000)), in the asymmetry of information between foreign and local investors (Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) , Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) , and Chen, Rui and Xu (2004) ), as well as in behaviors (Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) ). However, a consensus has not yet emerged.
As puzzling as is China's B-share discount, another mystery has attracted more attention;
namely, how China has experienced the fastest economic growth with such a weak legal and institutional environment. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) argue that China's fast economic growth is driven mainly by the private sector rather than through the activities of the larger state owned enterprises (SOEs). Indeed, considerable research has focused on the economic effects of the dominance of state-ownership in the A-share market. Contrary to research in other countries that shows how firms benefit from political connections, most of these papers on the A-share market unambiguously point out the detrimental effect of government ownership in China. 2 Firms with high state ownership have lower Tobin's q ratios (Tian (2001) , Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang (2004) , Wei and Varela (2003) ) and worse financial operating performance (Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000) ). Firms with high state ownership experience significantly negative returns around the announcement of related-party transactions with controlling interests in SOEs (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2008) ). Firms with higher state ownership and legal entity ownership are more likely to be accused of fraud (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui (2006) ). Firms with politically-connected CEOs experience significantly worse post-IPO long term stock returns (Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) ). of their study is that it is difficult to ascertain just how economically important state ownership is for the discount puzzle. Their study focuses on a period in which the level of state ownership did not change and, more importantly, there was little temporal variation in the B-share discounts.
As a result, endogeneity problems likely inhibit analysis of the economic effects; do investors choose to price a bigger discount for B-shares of firms with higher levels of share ownership or has the state chosen to relinquish its stake in those firms with lower discounts? One way to circumvent these limitations is by means of an exogenous event that induces a significant change in the B-share discount and one that we could, in turn, use to identify whether the consequences were different for firms with different levels of state ownership.
This paper exploits one such unique event which took place in 2001 . On February 19, 2001 , the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced that Chinese residents would be allowed to own B-shares previously restricted to foreign investors. The elimination of the foreign ownership restriction in China would have predictably reduced the Bshare discount and the consequence of this impact would have been greater for those Chinese firms in which the foreign investors priced in the larger premium for the level of state ownership.
Indeed, we find that the average B-share discount declined from 80% before the event to 40% by the end of 2001, but strikingly the "new" investors intensively pursued B-shares of those firms with lower, not higher, levels of state ownership. On average, firms with no state ownership experienced a 15% larger discount decline than those with higher state ownership. Furthermore, portfolios of B-shares with lower levels of state ownership experienced a statistically significant and economically large 7% abnormal return around this two-week period relative to those with higher state ownership.
Our cross-sectional regression analysis before and after the regulatory change confirms that B-share investors before the rule change undervalued stocks with higher state ownership on a relative basis (the discount difference between the highest state-ownership firms and lowest state ownership firms is 20%), but also shows that B-share investors after the event undervalued stocks with higher state ownership with even greater intensity (the average discount difference between the highest state-ownership firms and lowest state ownership firms grew to 35%). What we can infer is that those investors that took advantage of the new opportunity to enter the Bshare market after February 2001 appear to be just as wary of state ownership as the previous foreign investors, and even more so at the margin. Existing studies indicate that foreign investors command a higher premium for state ownership than domestic investors, so we might expect that opening up the B-share market would dissipate the higher premium for B-shares. We provide evidence that these investors were mostly comprised of domestic Chinese residents -rather than new or existing foreign investors -and that they priced the B-shares with high levels of state ownership at a discount similar in magnitude to that by foreign investors. We explore several alternative hypotheses later in the paper to sharpen this inference.
Our paper is not the only study that has exploited the February 2001 event to examine the B-share discount. The other studies, however, focus on other potential drivers of the discount change around the event.
3 Our paper, however, is the first to document a shift of perceived political risk and its valuation consequences due to the participation of different groups of investors during the event. 4 Indeed, this contribution is important as we find that the level of state ownership is the only statistically significant variable in the cross-sectional regression explaining discount changes. In terms of explanatory power, it can explain 60% of the cross-sectional variation in discount changes. Our paper also contributes importantly to the large existing literature on the B-share discount puzzle in China, to the broader literature on foreign ownership restrictions and equity price premiums, and finally to the newer burgeoning literature on the pricing of political risk, privatizations and stock market development in emerging economies.
The next section provides a brief description of China's stock exchanges and offers institutional details about the CSRC announcement in 2001. Section 3 describes the data, research design and results. Section 4 discusses several alternative hypotheses and some anecdotal evidence along with our interpretation of the findings. Section 5 summarizes the paper.
We specifically discuss why we title our paper only a "partial" resolution of the B-share puzzle and outline the institutional developments in this market since 2001.
CSRC's Opening of the B-share Market in 2001
Prior to 1992, foreign investors were not allowed to trade China's stock. In 1992, the CSRC allowed companies to issue so-called "Special Shares" that were restricted for trading by foreign investors, denominated in either Hong Kong dollars (traded in Shenzhen) or U.S. dollars (traded in Shanghai). While these "Special Shares" later were designated B-shares, the shares tradable by domestic residents were called A-shares. The Securities Law of China (passed on July 1, 1999) explicitly recognized the equal status of shareholders of both A-and B-shares. 
Data, Research Design and Results

Data
To conduct our study, we require data on share prices as well as firm characteristics. Datastream
International is used to collect daily closing prices, trading volumes and the numbers of shares outstanding data for 76 Chinese stocks listing both A-shares and B-shares. 
Estimation Methods
We estimate multivariate regression models of the B-share discounts computed before the Bshare market opened up and afterward, as well as of the change in the B-share discounts over this period. One important concern is that we measure as accurately as possible the immediate impact of the rule change on the markets, but with as little statistical noise due to imprecise measurement as possible. The tradeoff concerns the period over which to measure the B-share discounts before and after the event as well as a number of the control variables. We attempted various sample periods but report the results using the "Before" period from February 1, 2001
through February 19, 2001 and the "After" period from February 28 to April 1, 2001. All estimation is with ordinary least squares using t-statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity using White (1980).
The following regression models are estimated: (1b) where Discount it and ΔDiscount it denotes the pre-and post-event discount (a positive value denotes a discount) and the change in the discount for firm i. The subscript t denotes the period after the event and t-1 denotes that before the event. Govt Ownership it denotes the state ownership level in 2001 and D_own it is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm's government ownership in 2001 is equal to zero. We also introduce a dummy variable for those stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (I Shanghai ). The rest of the variables are as defined above.
Our central hypothesis outlines what we expect for the government ownership in the Bshare discount regression models in Equations (1a) and (1b). Based on Fernald and Rogers (2002) , we expect a positive relationship (γ 1 >0) before the rule change and that this relationship should weaken after the B-share market opened up (δ 1 <0). The dummy variable for firms with no state ownership stakes are designed to capture potential non-linearity in this relationship; we expect that the discount should be smaller for these firms (γ 2 <0) and that this difference should decline after the rule change (δ 2 <0).
We have expectations about the control variables in these equations. The volume ratio is a (inverse) proxy for the relative liquidity in the A-and B-share markets, which studies by Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) have found to be important for the B-share discount puzzle. If the liquidity hypothesis is correct, more liquid and thus more actively traded B-shares should be associated with a smaller discount (γ 3 <0) and this should weaken toward zero if the B-share market opens up (δ 3 >0). The differential demand hypothesis is based on a model by Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) . They propose that demand functions for domestic and foreign investors differ in terms of price elasticity. Their model would predict that the B-share discount is smaller as foreign demand increases. 9 As an empirical proxy, we use the ratio of outstanding B-shares to total outstanding shares. In equilibrium, of course, the distinction between measures of supply and demand may not be clear. If outstanding shares are primarily determined by supply of shares by firms rather than demand by investors, we may observe the discount across firms as a positive function of the ratio of B-shares to total shares outstanding (γ 4 >0). 10 After the rule change, the discount should decline more for firms with greater excess supply (δ 4 <0).
The differential risk hypothesis -first delineated by Bailey (1994) for China and later tested by Ma (1996) and Eun, Janakiramanan and Lee (2001) (2001) and Eun et al. (2001) test the hypothesis between the discount and these risks, but they uncover mixed evidence. We also consider the volatility ratio as a proxy for relative risks and would predict that higher relative total risk of B-shares should be associated with a larger B-share discount (γ 7 >0). All three of these risk sensitivities should diminish toward zero with the rule change (δ 8 >0, δ 9 <0 and δ 7 <0). Finally, the asymmetric information hypothesis suggests that B-shares trade at a discount because foreign investors have less information than local investors (due to language barriers, different accounting rules). Following
Sun and Tong (2000) and Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) , we would expect that this disadvantage is 9 There has been strong empirical support for this hypothesis in other markets (see, e.g., Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) in Thailand, Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999) in Mexico). 10 Interestingly, for very similar tests, Sun and Tong (2000) and Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) find a positive relationship between the B-share discount and the relative number of B-shares to total shares outstanding. Sun and Tong (2000) regard the relative number of B-shares outstanding as being determined by the supply and since more B shares outstanding puts downward pressure on B-share prices thus increasing the B-share discount, they confirm the differential demand hypothesis. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) , on the other hand, interpret more B-shares outstanding as evidence of larger foreign demand which should result in a small B-share discount and reject the hypothesis.
smaller for larger firms, so γ 5 is expected to be negative, but that this would diminish after the Bshare market opens up (δ 5 >0).
The second experiment in our study constructs portfolios of stocks based on the level of state ownership and the tests for differences in their risk-adjusted returns performance during the event period. We estimate a system of equations using Zellner's (1962) Seemingly-Unrelated (SUR) model and a multi-index returns generating model for daily A-and B-share returns, respectively:
D it is a dummy variable that is equal to one if t is between February 28, 2001 and March 6, 2001 for the period (first five trading days) that Chinese residents were allowed to trade B-shares, and zero, otherwise. R iPt is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of A-share or B-share stocks We estimate the SUR model for quintile portfolios by level of state ownership and apply the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989, henceforth GRS) test that the intercepts, α P , are jointly equal to zero, distributed as an F-statistic, to measure whether the returns different from each other on a risk-adjusted basis. We also compute a supplementary test whether the risk-adjusted returns are significantly different during the period of the rule change by evaluating whether α P +γ P are equal across the five portfolios. Finally, the same tests are computed for the extreme (highest and lowest state-ownership level quintile) portfolios only. Table 2 reports the cross-sectional regression results. The dependent variables for Panels A, B and C are, respectively, the average B-share discount before and after the opening of the B-share market and the change in the average discount from the pre-to post-event period. We report a series of univariate and then one multivariate specification (always Model 9 in each panel) with coefficient estimates, associated t-statistics and the adjusted R 2 . Based on the consistent results from different regressions and the explanatory power of state ownership, we conclude that state ownership, our proxy for political risk, is a key factor in explaining the B-share discount. New investors that entered the liberalized B-share market appeared to be even more averse to firms with high state ownership than the original B-share investors, ceteris paribus. This is a surprising result. not change A-share betas in any significant way (β PAD equals zero for all portfolios). All the riskadjusted returns on these A-share quintile portfolios (α P ) equal zero and they are not significantly different after the regulatory change (γ P equals zero for all portfolios). GRS tests with associated F-statistics of the joint equality of the γ P and of their zero exclusion (γ P equals zero for each portfolio) confirm that there were no changes in the risk-adjusted returns over this period.
Results
The opening-up of the B-share market, however, did affect the B-share market significantly and in an unequal way. Portfolios with lowest state ownership stocks experience 7% daily risk-adjusted returns after the regulatory change whereas those with high state ownership stocks experience none. Interestingly, the risk-adjusted returns on all five portfolios are significantly positive during this special two-month period of analysis, though not in a significantly different way. We apply the GRS test to examine whether the February event has an impact and whether it is a significantly different one across portfolios in Tests 1 and 2, respectively. Indeed, the effect of the regulatory change on the B-share portfolios is different across portfolios at the 1% significance level (Test 4 F-statistic is 11.29).
Tests of Alternative Hypotheses
Our cross-sectional regressions and portfolio analysis revealed the following facts: (1) before February were as wary of political risk as the original foreign investors, who, compared to existing Ashare investors, had already priced a substantial political risk premium. We believe that this regulatory event inspired new domestic resident participants who had a very different outlook than existing domestic residents participating in the A-share market and who had a more similar outlook to those of foreign investors. But other explanations are possible. We will discuss some possible alternative explanations and provide either direct or circumstantial evidence that leads to our rejection of those alternatives in favor of our interpretation of the events.
Anticipation of state share selling?
On June 14, 2001, the Chinese State Council announced a series of long-awaited rules on how it plans to fund a long-term social welfare shortfall by allowing state-owned shares to be sold on the stock market. State-owned shares to this point in time belonged to a special category of equity that could not be traded on the market. Appendix B details a series of key events related to these rule announcements. If local investors were anticipating these new policy rules back in 
New group of foreign investors?
We do not know the identity of B-share investors. Though the policy change allowed
Chinese residents to hold B-shares, it could still be that the investors in the B-share market were comprised of a new group of foreign investors who entered the B-share market after February 2001 because they perceived a policy shift in China's market development through the signal of the integration of the A-and B-share markets. 
Some evidence on new local investors.
There exists some anecdotal evidence to support our conjecture that it is indeed new when Chinese nationals were allowed to trade B-shares with spot exchange deposits and foreign currency cash deposits opened after February 19, as well as foreign exchange funds transferred from overseas. 16 We infer from this fact is that only a special clientele of domestic Chinese 
Conclusions
Explaining China's B-share discount puzzle has been a significant challenge. Numerous explanations have been put forward, including ones based on differential liquidity of the two classes of shares, differential risks, differential demand and asymmetric information effects among local and foreign investors. Our contribution -which we boldly declare a "resolution" of the puzzle in our title -arises from analyzing a natural experiment that took place in February 2001 in which the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission allowed local Chinese investors to trade B-shares which were previously restricted to foreign investors. This policy change represented an important event in China's capital markets as the B-share discounts that had been averaging over 80% across almost 80 different stocks declined dramatically to 40% on average within months.
We specifically exploit the information in the cross-sectional dispersion of the discount declines across the stocks. Our simple model can explain 60% of the cross-sectional variation of the discount changes. The most important explanatory factor is the political risk factor, which we proxy with the fraction of shares owned by the state. That is, immediately after the opening of conditional expectations of asset returns to expected factor risk premiums and assets' exposures to those risk factors. For companies, regulators and decision makers in developing countries, foreign investors are drawn to stocks only selectively in countries with less transparent reporting and accounting systems and with weak governance systems that inadequately protect their interests as minority shareholders. Often, they pay high premiums when their general demand for international investment is high, as in the case of most markets around the world for unrestricted over restricted classes of the same shares (Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999) ). Sometimes, as was the case in China before February 2001, they will allow large discounts to arise and persist, in spite of potentially great demand, simply because of needed legal or political reforms. rate," he said. Many analysts have feared the low price of B shares would lure people to sell A shares for foreign currency to trade B shares. Under the tight foreign exchange scheme, it is likely some people will turn to the underground market to illegally exchange money. "Only legally acquired foreign currency can be used to trade B shares and all investors should abide by the regulations," the CSRC spokesman said. The CSRC and SAFE joint announcement also stipulated that Chinese residents would be barred from withdrawing hard currency from B share fund accounts or sending money out of the country. Shifting hard currency at home would also be limited within the same city and bank. In spite of the restrictions, investors have been fidgeting over the past few days. China's Finance Minister, Xiang Huaicheng, spoke at a forum in Beijing that it is appropriate for China to reduce its ownership of listed companies in order to help fund social security needs.
China Press June 14, 2001
The Chinese State Council announced a series of long-awaited rules on how it plans to fund a chronic social welfare shortfall by allowing state-owned shares to be sold on the stock market. State-owned shares have hitherto belonged to a special category of equity that could not be traded on the market. The new rules permit their sale and stipulate that 10% of state companies' initial public offerings should consist of state-owned shares and that the proceeds from their sale should go into a national social security fund. The new rules also applied to companies planning to list abroad and existing overseas listed companies.
Dow Jones Reuters July 24, 2001
The first flotation of so-called state shares is announced. They are priced much higher than expected. Four Chinese companies planning A-share listings announced they would sell state shares equivalent to 10% of their initial public offering (IPO) proceeds and the state shares will be priced at the same levels as their IPO shares.
Reuters Oct 22, 2001
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced the suspension of the sale of shares in state-owned companies used to support the national social security fund and hoped that this will steady its weakening stock market.
Financial Times Dec 18, 2001
China's multi-billion-dollar Social Security Fund will be allowed to invest in shares as a way to increase liquidity in stock markets. Fund chairman, Liu Zhongli, said that it would be able to place 40 per cent of its 61 billion Yuan (about HK$57.16 billion) in the country's stock markets.
South China Morning Post
